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ABSTRACT 
PEACE ON G-D'S TERMS: 
THE IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT OF CHRISTIAN ZIONISM 
by 
James Alton Croker III 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2008 
This study examines the Christian Zionist movement. It identifies the motivations, 
composition, and objectives of the Christian Zionist movement in order to illuminate the 
interest group's influence on U.S. foreign policy making on Israel. The movement's 
influence results from the framing of its ideology as a political project, through which the 
movement is able to capitalize on a pre-existing pro-Israel opinion bias among 
Evangelicals, construct a community of believers from these individuals, and mobilize 
that community into action. This argument shows that classic realist accounts, such as 
that put forward in Mearsheimer and Walt's work, do not account for a definition of the 
national interest that is not characterized in terms of realpolitick, and are therefore 
inappropriate when discussing Christian Zionists. The national interest in the view of 




The American mythos holds that every voice is equally important, and that policy 
formation is purely a 'numbers game', where whichever side of the debate has the 
majority is the winner. Superficially, this is how laws and policies are decided upon. In 
this view, the evolution of interest groups was a natural, predictable political 
phenomenon. However, from the earliest stages of the American democratic experiment 
there have been exceptions to the rule. The alleged power of the majority has been 
second to the more significant power of the minority. Namely, those individuals and 
groups with significant amounts of political (and fiscal) capital have been able to access 
the officials who make policies at a higher level than the average citizen and steer 
legislators to construct policies that advance private interests over public ones. The 
perpetrators of this steering have been the so-called special interests that, rightly or 
wrongly, have become synonymous with governmental corruption and the subversion of 
the democratic process. 
Today, special interest groups are the targets of politicians seeking to frame 
themselves as political reformers. Politicians prey on the public's distaste for unpopular 
policies and their outcomes, and accuse their opponents of instituting those policies at the 
pleasure of powerful special interest groups. The premise of such criticisms is that the 
special interest never mirrors the public sentiment. In truth, every side of every issue has 
special interest groups advocating for it. Numerous scholars have shown how interest 
groups and individuals seek political capital to 'sway' policy makers and influence the 
1 
outcome of the policy making process. The existing body of literature examining interest 
group politics produces an image of the American policy making machine operating on a 
system of quid pro quo, where powerful lobby groups purchase legislation that is 
conducive to their interests through campaign contributions, voter mobilization, and 
ethically dubious 'perks'.1 While these methods are generally legal and the interest 
groups themselves do in fact represent actual voters, it is easy to see how the public is 
distrustful of them. This distrust is increased when scholars argue that it is possible for 
an interest group to exert enough influence on the policy making process that it 
contributes to the development of policy at odds with the national interest, and possesses 
enough capacity to silence opposition to that policy. 
This thesis examines one attempt to shape a U.S. foreign policy that is criticized 
as not only opposed to the national interest, but also supposedly undermines the principle 
of religious separation: the work of the Christian Zionist lobby to maintain a pro-Israel 
U.S. foreign policy.1 John Mearsheimer and Stephan Walt's work, The Israel Lobby and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, makes the argument that the pro-Israel Lobby2 is the most important 
influence on the policy making process, and that the resulting policy stream violates the 
national interest. Their argument rests on realist articulations of the national interest, 
and on the assumption that the Lobby focuses on a set of issues to which the public is 
1
 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). For the purposes of this study, Mearsheimer and Walt's understanding of 
pro-Israel is used. Pro-Israel denotes high levels of military and economic aid, favorable lending terms, 
supportive votes in international organizations, highly entangled military alliance, de facto support for 
settlement activities and security policies and understanding the conflict to be the product of violence by 
Palestinians. 
2
 Ibid, 5. The Lobby in Mearsheimer and Walt denotes, "the loose coalition of individuals and 
organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel (see above) direction....it is 
not a single, unified movement with a central leadership, and it is certainly not a cabal or conspiracy that 
'controls' U.S. foreign policy. It is simply a powerful interest group, made up of both Jews and gentiles, 
whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel's case within the United States and Influence American 
foreign policy in ways that its members believe will benefit the Jewish state." 
3
 Ibid, 4. 
2 
generally politically indifferent. While Christian Zionists are included in their work on 
the Lobby, Mearsheimer and Walt's argument relegates the movement to almost 
periphery status, and emphasizes the influence of American Jews. This argument is 
directly contradicted by Stephen Zunes' argument that Christian Zionists "are, at this 
point, more significant in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Israel than are Jewish 
Zionists."4 
Christian Zionism is foundationally a theopolitical ideology, whose adherents 
understand their theological origins to affect political purposes. It is characterized by the 
belief in the teleological need for a political nation state of Israel, composed of Jews, in 
the biblical geography of Ancient Israel, along with a religious community practicing 
traditional pre-rabbinic temple worship, in a restored temple, on the Temple Mount, as 
pre-requisites for Jesus Christ's return and the establishment of His kingdom on Earth. 
Christian Zionist political action is aimed at providing material, financial, and political 
support for the state of Israel, for Israeli policies aimed at expanding territorial 
hegemony, and for complete Jewish sovereignty over Jerusalem. This political action is 
accomplished through lobbying activities by organized political action committees, cues 
from religious elites, the promotion of candidates who espouse a pro-Israel stance, and 
direct financial assistance to rightist pro-Israel Zionist groups in the U.S. and in Israel 
for increased settlement efforts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). 
4
 Stephen Zunes, "The Role of the Christian Right in U.S. Middle East Policy," Middle East Policy 12, no. 
2 (2005):76. 
5
 Theopolitical is to be understood as being an issue or ideology that is politically salient, but is also 
intimately entangled with religious life. This is based on the idea expressed in Robert O. Smith, "Between 
Restoration and Liberation: Theopolitical Contributions and Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy in 
Israel/Palestine." Journal of Church and State 46, no. 4 (2004). 
See Maria Brettschneider, Cornerstones of Peace: Jewish Identity Politics and Democratic Theory (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996). It is important to note this distinction. As will be discussed 
later, there is significant movement in approval ratings on Israeli government policies among American 
3 
While the Christian Zionist Movement was included in the loose network that 
composes Mearsheimer and Walt's Lobby, the movement espouses motives and end goals 
that distinguishes it from the Jewish and neo-conservative elements. These groups all 
work collaboratively, but their influence and objectives differ. Christian Zionists and the 
rest of the Lobby agree that a pro-Israel foreign policy is in the national interest. 
However, the national interest for Christian Zionists moves beyond the realpolitik issues 
Mearsheimer and Walt argue drive the Lobby's most significant organization, the 
American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), into the realm of theology, 
eschatology and teleology that characterizes the ideological project of Christian Zionism. 
Christian Zionists include values and beliefs in their articulation of the national interest 
that are not adequately accounted for in the realist premise of Mearsheimer and Walt. 
How does the Christian Zionist movement mobilize the U.S. public from being generally 
but quiescently supportive of Israel, to a place of agency aimed at influencing policy 
formation? 
This thesis identifies the motivations, composition, and objectives of the Christian 
Zionist movement, as defined both by existing scholarly research and by internal 
movement voices and literature, illuminating how the movement's political project is 
ideologically framed. This analysis shows how Christian Zionism's capacity to 
influence foreign policy is rooted firmly in this ideological framing, and is manifest in the 
special relationship between the movement and Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt's 
characterization of this process as simply an attempt to control public discourse is 
Jews. This is due in large part to the Jewish Peace Movement that has emerged among Jewish 
"progressives" in Israel and throughout the Diaspora community. This movement has word extensively to 
articulate a different definition of pro-Israel. While this movement has seen a transition and shift in Jewish 
pro-Israel opinion, there has not been a shift in the pro-Israel policy advanced by the Lobby; this suggests 
importance of non-Jewish elements in the continued efforts to advance the pro-Israel policy regime. 
4 
insufficient and reveals a minor problem in their argument, which is premised on a 
general sense of apathy on a policy issue among the electorate. The fact that Christian 
Zionists possess significant capacity to shape public discourse stems from the inherent 
pro-Israel bias in public opinion that underlies that apathy, and the significant 
relationship that religious identity plays in determining an individual's pro-Israel 
sentiments. 
Chapter One provides background information for the research and a general 
overview of the literature in which this research is grounded. A significant amount of 
research has framed pro-Israel U.S. policy as serving the national interest as articulated 
by realists. Mearsheimer and Walt extend realist analysis of policy into the realm of 
domestic politics. They frame the Lobby'?, policies goals as increases of relative power 
for the U.S and Israel, but they argue that the policies the Lobby's, efforts produce violate 
realist understandings of the national interest. What these realist scholars miss in their 
"guns and butter" analysis of the Lobby is the role religious ideology plays in Christian 
Zionism. These scholars overlook the role religious ideology can play in policy 
formation. This section highlights the work of Jonathan Fox, which identifies the false 
assumptions that lead social scientists to dismiss the power of religion. This chapter also 
defines the operative concepts and variables, and outlines the general methods of 
analysis. 
Chapter Two shows that Christian Zionists are, for the most part, "preaching to 
the choir", by showing the presence of a pro-Israel bias in American public opinion. This 
analysis contradicts Mearsheimer and Walt's assumption that attempts to control the 
public discourse on Israel focus on an issue to which the general public is apathetic. 
5 
Statistical analysis shows that there is a significant relationship between religious identity 
in terms of the Born Again Christians who compose the Christian Zionist movement, and 
support for Israel. This relationship suggests a possible causal relationship between 
Christian Zionist ideology and the pro-Israel sentiment of those who believe the ideology. 
Chapter Three answers the questions, "What is Christian Zionism and what does 
it want?" To answer these questions this study examines the group's composition, 
history, and ideology as presented by academics, movement members and elites, and the 
movement's own literature. This chapter explores what unifies and distinguishes 
Christian Zionism from expressions of Jewish Zionism. In doing so, it is clear how and 
why these diverging groups choose to collaborate in some of their policy advocacy. This 
chapter presents the agenda of Christian Zionists as an ideological project framed for its 
community as a political project for political action. This framing is accomplished 
through ministry activities.7 This project and the policy it aims at producing is what 
distinguishes the group from the other elements of Mearsheimer and Walt's Lobby, and 
requires a different reading of the national interest than is offered by these theorists. 
Chapter Four of this work examines the economic value of this ideology. It 
mirrors Mearsheimer and Walt's analysis of the 'special relationship' between the U.S. 
Q 
and Israel, and examines the 'special relationship' between the Christian Zionist 
movement and Israel, illustrating how the movement's ministry efforts impact Israel. 
This chapter examines Christian Zionism's 'blessing' of Israel. While relatively minor 
when compared to the Diaspora philanthropy and U.S. military and economic aid, the 
funding streams from Christian Zionists, like traditional Zionist philanthropy, are shown 
7
 Ministry activities include religious broadcasts, literature, conferences, sermons, Sunday school programs, 
holy land tours, religious crafts, and fundraising. 
8
 This is classified within the movement as 'blessing' Israel. 
6 
to be classifiable as ideological rent, which is a major element of the advocacy project of 
the group. This section looks at the funds contributed by Christian Zionists to Israel, and 
highlights the type of programming their philanthropy targets. In doing so, it becomes 
clear how embedded this "blessing" of Israel is to the ultimate Christian Zionist agenda. 
The final section of this thesis seeks to make sense of the national interest as 
Christian Zionists have framed it, and examine whether or not the pro-Israel policy 
regime contradicts it. The failure of Mearsheimer and Walt is to not adequately 
incorporate the power of ideology in their analysis of interest group influence. For 
Christian Zionists, the national interest is not framed in terms of the realist realpolitick, 
the national interest is framed in terms of religious ideology. For Christian Zionists, the 
terms for a just and sustainable Middle East peace are G-d's terms as they understand 
them to be articulated. This is in essence the divine interest, and the divine interest is 
central to the Christian Zionist construction of the national interest. 
This thesis presents a more complex picture of how Christian Zionism shapes 
U.S. policy than Mearsheimer and Walt do. The Christian Zionist lobby draws its 
influence from its status as an ideological project, in which religious identity and belief 
are the points of access by which the group is able to shape the public discourse. The 
ideological project is evident in the ministry's effort to 'bless' Israel, and the manner in 
which the movement constructs its understanding of the national interest. To understand 
this construction, one must understand the movement. 
7 
CHAPTER I 
WHOSE POLICY IS IT ANYWAY? 
The Problem 
There is a general consensus among academics, policy experts, politicians, and 
the general public that the foreign policy of the U.S. is overwhelmingly pro-Israel. The 
friendship that characterizes the bilateral relationship is evident in direct foreign 
assistance, military aid, and political support. Direct economic aid to Israel from the U.S. 
totaled $240 million in fiscal year 20069 and direct foreign assistance remains steady at 
approximately $3 billion annually.10 Moreover, a recent arms agreement between the 
U.S. and Israel includes a military aid package providing $30 billion over the next 10 
years.11 Political support is seen in the U.S. diplomatic position on Israel in the United 
Nations (UN). Between 1972 and 2006 the U.S. vetoed 42 U.N. Security Council 
resolutions it viewed as critical of Israel, and the U.S. continues to support Israeli military 
and anti-terrorism activities. This support for Israel has proven problematic for the U.S. 
because it is perceived as U.S. approval for controversial Israeli policies regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
9
 "Israel" CIA World Factbook, 2007 edition, Available from 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.htrnl> Accessed on 13 April 2008. 
10
 Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel Lobby, 24. They total U.S. Aid to Israel at $154 Billion, as of 2005 in 
2005 dollars. They quote Rep. Lee Hamilton who reported annual U.S. Aid figures at $4.3 Billion. 
11
 "Israel hails U.S. Military Aid Rise", Available from 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle east/6920988.stm> 
Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel Lobby, 40. These vetoes exceeded the total vetoes of other SC 
members for the same period and over half of U.S. vetoes for the period. 
8 
The international community has classified many Israeli policies as being in 
violation of human rights, and the U.S. is seen as being complicit." Within the U.N., 
international opinion has repeatedly been shown to be highly critical of Israeli settlement 
expansions, its water resource allocation policies, and its security protocols. Scholars 
like Bayefsky13 and Shattan14 highlight the emergence of an anti-Israel bias within the 
international community. Glaring inconsistencies within U.S. foreign policy as it relates 
to Israel has also been highlighted when examining U.S. policies on human rights in 
general. Scott Turner focuses on U.S. policies specifically seeking to undermine 
international institutions in order to advance a pro-Israel U.S. policy.15 He emphasizes 
U.S. opposition to the International Criminal Court and the rulings of the International 
Court of Justice, while it simultaneously attempts to develop U.N. Security Council 
resolutions and military actions on the grounds of human rights violations. For Turner, 
the placing of international human rights initiatives second to the U.S.'s strategic interest 
is resulting in a reduction of U.S. hegemonic power and risks allowing the U.S. to be 
criticized as a human rights violator. He argues that U.S. 'soft power' is diminished, 
resulting in a decline in international prestige. Why would a state engage a foreign policy 
that is controversial and undermines its moral standing in the international community? 
This can only be answered from a realist perspective, which denies moral 
imperatives as legitimate sources of foreign policy. Classical realists, like Hobbes,16 
focus instead on the prominence of self interests and the need for social contracts to 
13
 Anne Bayefsky, "Israel, the United Nations, and the Road Map," American Foreign Policy Interests, 25 
no. 5 (2003). 
14
 Joseph J. Shattan, "Israel, the United States, and the United Nations," World Affairs, 143 no. 4(1981). 
15
 Scott Turner, "The Dilemma of Double Standards in U.S. Human Rights Policy," Peace & Change, 28 
no. 4 (2003). 
16
 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (New York: Penguin Books, 1983). 
9 
guarantee protection from other actors seeking the advancement of their own self interest. 
Realists continue to perceive power and security to be the primary concerns of states.111 
Jervis acknowledges that states will seek a high measure of security, by engaging foreign 
policies that best protect themselves.17 States pursue international dominance because it 
is the only way to ensure their own security, that is to say, hegemony is a means to an end 
and hegemony characterized by continuous conflict would not guarantee security. 
Rather, the state will rationally assess the dynamics of a given situation and choose the 
course of action that will provide the greatest guarantee of physical and material security. 
Another way to understand this phenomenon is to say that states can be expected to 
maximize their relative power. 
Power is not military might alone. K.J. Holsti notes that, "the definition of power 
is often synonymous with the elements of national power, which is the physical assets a 
nation possesses."18 He argues that power should be understood as a quantity that is 
relatively defined. It is characterized by the process of influence in a relationship 
between multiple states and is advanced by material or intellectual capabilities that allow 
for inducement of actions by an outside party.19 In this light, the national interest of a 
given state is to increase military, economic, and diplomatic power, which is its relative 
ability to coerce other states into meeting its own self-interested motives. If the realist 
assumption that increased power is the primary motive of states and their definition of 
national interest are both accepted, then the question becomes whether or not a pro-Israel 
17
 Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," International Organization, 52 no. 4 (1998): 
981. This echoes the principle of self-help. 
18





policy reflects the national interest and somehow increases the amount of power the U.S. 
holds. 
Significant amounts of research have shown how, historically, a pro-Israel policy 
was judged to be consistent with the national interest, when the national interest was 
synonomous with anti-communism.lv During the Cold War the president and the State 
Department used an alliance with Israel as part of a larger strategy to balance the power 
of the Soviet Union through containment. In this system, Israel stood as a liberal 
democracy in a region where the Soviets were seeking to gain power. As Edward 
Fernandez notes, Arab regimes often looked to the Soviet Union for military assistance 
(when the U.S. did not supply it) to combat Israel.21 Moreover, communist movements in 
Arab states were pronounced, and Western politicians feared these states would adopt 
communist regimes. Post-colonial movements in Arab states were ALSO pronounced, 
and Western politicians misread the political character of these movements and wrongly 
feared these states would adopt communist regimes. This lead specifically to the policy 
of containment, which Gelvin asserts was the paramount policy goal of Washington in 
the Middle East.22 
As Gelvin notes, a U.S. policy of containment was originally structured under the 
Truman administration to emphasize a balance of power in the region, but shifted to 
promoting an Israeli military power equal to the sum of its regional neighbors. This shift 
occurred immediately before the 1967 war, when U.S. military aid to Israel increased 
Containment was the process by which the U.S. sought to prevent the expansion of communism and the 
influence of the U.S.S.R through the development of proxy states amenable to U.S. interests. 
21
 Fernandez, "The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 43. 
22
 Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 259-262. 
11 
from $12.9 million in 1965 to $90 million in 1966. The 1967 war marks a critical shift 
in U.S. aid to Israel, largely due to ideological sympathies with the Israeli state, leading 
up to the U.S. goverment replacing the Jewish Diaspora as the primary source of rent to 
Israel in 1971.24 Beinin notes that it was under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that 
the U.S. engaged a policy of establishing proxy states to fight the battles necessary to 
maintain the containment strategy. The result was a heavily aided Israel, to prevent 
regional dominance by a single state or a collective of states with strong anti-Western 
policies. This is the view expressed by Secretary of State George Shultz, who articulated 
that U.S. policy would, "make clear to the world-through our material and moral support 
for Israel.. .that we are a permanent, steadfast and unshakable ally for the state of Israel." 
Shultz outlined the historical origins for the U.S. policies in support of the state of Israel 
that were framed ideologically.25 
Currently, military and economic aid has been used to combat and contain 
Islamist political movements in the OPTs and to prevent 'hostile' regimes from gaining 
regional dominance.26 The effort to contain communism, anti-western nationalism, and 
Islamist ideology are based in neo-conservative idealism and underpins current foreign 
policy efforts to promote democracy, economic liberalism, and Western cultural norms. 
While historical and contemporary motives remain largely reflective of the U.S.'s stated 
policy goals for the region, those policy goals are constructed in large part due to the 
ideological framing of the U.S.'s conflict with ideological movements like communism, 
23
 Mansour, Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy, 190. 
Joel Beinin, "The United States - Israeli Alliance," In Wrestling with Zion: Progressive Jewish-American 
Responses to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Ed. Tony Kushner and Alisa Solomon, (New York: Grove 
Press, 2003): 43. 
Shultz, "The United States and Israel." 
26See Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel Lobby, Part II. 
12 
nationalism, and Islamism that are seen to threaten its access to necessary resources and 
promote regional security threats. Israel is important not only because of its proximity to 
the oil wealth of the Gulf States, but because of the ideological and political threats that 
emerge when those resources are under the control of regimes and individuals who 
disagree with the ideological orientation of the U.S. 
The Premise 
The Power to Influence 
For realists, the U.S. holds the unique position of being the dominant international 
actor involved in attempts at developing a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
due in large part to its status as the international hegemon in a unipolar world. It is also 
Israel's most important ally. As noted, the U.S. has been subject to significant amounts 
of criticism that its foreign policy regime is overwhelmingly pro-Israel, which prevents 
the U.S. from being viewed as an 'honest broker' in peace efforts between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Regardless of international opinions on the ethics of the special 
relationship, such a relationship can be expected when it benefits the national interest of 
the state. However, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that U.S. support for Israel violates the 
national interest. 
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that U.S. policy on Israel has undermined the 
objectives of the global war on terror, lead the U.S. into an unnecessary war in Iraq, put 
the U.S. at a diplomatic disadvantage in relations with Iran and Syria, and has removed 
the moral authority of the U.S. in international affairs because of its (perceived) support 
of ethically questionable practices by the Israeli government in how it deals with the 
13 
disputed territories of Palestine. They acknowledge power and security to constitute the 
national interest. However, they highlight these problems as evidence that the pro-Israel 
policy neither reflects the national interest nor operates as a means of achieving it. If 
policy critics are correct and the direction of U.S. foreign policy on Israel is in conflict 
with the national interest, it is then necessary to determine what factors lead to the 
formation of such a policy. 
Mearsheimer and Walt's answer is framed at the domestic determinants level of 
analysis. Their analysis holds that foreign policy is formulated by a broad range of 
individuals, agencies, and groups, and that lobbying organizations have the greatest 
ability to influence all of these policy makers. In engaging a domestic determinants level 
analysis it is necessary to look at the various groups whose aim is to shape the direction 
of policy formation, specifically the various interest groups and lobbying networks that 
characterize the U.S. political system. In the case of the U.S. and the state of Israel, 
Mearsheimer and Walt look to the coalition of organizations and individuals who engage 
to shape a pro-Israel foreign policy. For the purposes of this work, interest group is 
defined as a coalition of individuals and organizations that advocates for a certain policy 
position and actively seeks to influence policy formation in favor of that position.28 
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the ability of pro-Israel interest groups to lobby elected 
officials, make large campaign contributions, mobilize voters, and influence public 
opinion serves as a source of power and influence for these interest groups. These groups 
27
 Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel Lobby, 337. They identify three specific policy goals that compose the 
U.S. national interest, these are: maintaining access to Middle East oil resources, preventing Middle East 
states (excluding Israel) from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and eliminating the threat of 
international terrorism. Their argument is that the current pro-Israel policy, and the limited ability of policy 
actors and the public to criticize that policy, prevent the U.S. from meeting these goals. 
28
 Ibid. This definition is based on Mearsheimer and Walt's definition of the Lobby. 
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then use this power to influence the individuals who formulate foreign policy, thereby 
ensuring its direction regardless of whether or not it conflicts with the national strategic 
29 
interest. 
Much of the scholarly research on the special relationship has focused on how 
U.S. foreign policy is formulated, and emphasizes the influence of interest groups, 
especially AIPAC and American Jewish groups. Mearsheimer and Walt were not the 
first scholars to identify the Lobby, or even first to measure its level of influence/ 
However, their inquiry is unique in that it comes from prominent realist theorists who 
emphasize the primary status of the state as an international actor. Mearsheimer and 
Walt's analysis still acknowledges the state as the most important international actor, but 
they emphasize the decision making process of a state can be skewed by an interest group 
with a high level of capacity. Their work is also unique in that it acknowledges the role 
lobbying efforts by the Christian Right, specifically the Christian Zionist movement, have 
had in contributing to foreign policy formation. 
Grace Halsell argues President Reagan was personally committed to the 
dispensationalist ideology of Christian Zionism and looked to the coming of Armageddon 
more than a peaceful resolution between Israel and its Arab neighbors.30 With the 
election of President George W. Bush, scholars have argued that the Christian Right has 
attained a level of influence over policy formation they have never held before, because 
of the president's identification as an Evangelical and the realities of a post 9-11 
environment/1 In this light, scholars cite previous distancing of the administration from 
its highly touted Quartet Based Road Map to Peace as evidence of interest group 
29
 Ibid. 
Grace Halsell, Prophecy and Politics: The Secret Alliance Between Israel and the US Christian Right 
(Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 40. 
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influence on the administration's policy making.31 It seems it is accurate to say the 
Christian Zionist movement possesses the capacity to influence foreign policy formation; 
this influence comes from the movement's ideology. Mearsheimer and Walt's analysis is 
correct in pointing to interest groups at the domestic determinants level as a major force 
in the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Where their analysis is flawed is in missing 
religious ideology as the source of that power. They miss this because of a bias in social 
science, especially among realists in the field of international relations, which overlooks 
religious faith as a political force. Should religiously oriented interest groups be 
considered in discussions of policy formation? 
The Gap 
Leaving Religion Out 
Scholars have been somewhat reluctant to examine the relationship between 
religious belief and the development of U.S. foreign policy. This hesitancy has put 
international relations scholarship at a severe disadvantage, when the policies of a state 
are meant to address issues that are best understood as theopolitical. The presence of 
theopolitical issues in the international arena has sparked lobbying efforts from 
religiously based interests groups, most notably Evangelical Christians. Its lobbying 
efforts in the foreign policy arena have focused on numerous issues including human 
rights, humanitarian aid, and abstinence based anti-HIV/AIDS programs.32 The 
31
 Burge, "Christian Zionism, Evangelicals and Israel"; Durham, "Evangelical Protestantism and Foreign 
Policy in the United States after September 11"; Haija, "The Armageddon Lobby: Dispensationalist 
Christian Zionism and the Shaping of U.S. Policy Towards Israel-Palestine"; Haija, "Christian Zionism in 
the US Elections and Policy"; Zunes, "The Influence of the Christian Right in US Middle East Policy". 
32
 See Lawrence Davidson, "Christian Zionism as a Representation of American Manifest Destiny"; Martin 
Durham, "Evangelical Protestantism and Foreign Policy in the United States after September 11"; William 
Martin, "The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy." Mary Ann Tetreault and Robert A. 
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Israeli/Palestinian conflict is understood by many in the Christian Right as a theopolitical 
issue. Christian Zionists understand Israel to be the most important issue theologically 
and politically. They focus their lobbying efforts to accomplish politically what they are 
obligated to do theologically. 
Scholarly work on the influence of religious movements on foreign policy 
formation is seriously lacking. Jonathan Fox's work seeks to determine why religion is 
overlooked by some academics as a major influence on international relations, and to 
illuminate those influences which are often overlooked.33 While Fox acknowledges 
religion is only one factor among a complex milieu of factors that can influence 
international political events, he argues that more scholarship is necessary to illuminate 
the effect religion has independently of other factors. In this work, Fox identifies three a 
priori premises of social science inquiry, which he considers to be fallacies, which have 
prevented scholars and policy makers from adequately understanding the role religion 
plays in international relations. 
Fox holds that the primary reason religion is overlooked in the study of 
international relations is the rejection of religion by social scientists in an effort to 
provide rational expectations and guidelines for human behavior. He highlights the 
legacy of the enlightenment tradition, which believed reason and rationality would 
replace the authority of religious traditions and beliefs. Scholars including Voltaire, 
Comte, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx all concluded that "religion was a declining force in 
Denemark, G-d, Guns, and Globalization: Religious Radicalism and International Political Economy 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
" Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations," International Studies 
Review 3, no. 3 (2001). 
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the world.. .that would eventually disappear." That Enlightenment tradition, he argues, 
extends into the twentieth century. When political science shifted from historicizing 
political events to theorizing and predicting political behavior, political scientists 
erroneously "believed that modernization would reduce the political significance of 
primordial phenomena [including] ethnicity and religion," international relations theorists 
mistakenly assumed that "the era in which religion caused war was over." 
His second argument holds that social scientists in general, and international 
relations scholars specifically, operate from the presupposition of a trend toward 
secularization in society, and this false presupposition has missed the reality that 
modernization has actually lead to a resurgence of religion and religiosity, especially in 
the 'less developed world'. Fox accepts the argument that the processes of 
modernization has left individuals feeling "alienated, disoriented, and dislocated," and 
therefore have been left "more open to the overtures of religious movements."36 
However, he emphasizes that fundamentalist movements do not completely reject the 
trappings of modernization. He highlights the reality that these movements use modern 
organizational, communications, and propaganda techniques along with political action. 
This capitalization on the products of modernity has therefore allowed fundamentalist 
movements to come into more direct conflict with secular society at large. He goes on to 
argue that most social scientists operate from a classical liberalist paradigm where the 
state and religion are relegated to separate spheres. This is an egregious mistake in Fox's 





this particular value inculcation. In essence, political scientists and international relations 
theorists are looking at the world through the wrong lens. 
The third major misconception Fox seeks to debunk rests in the desire of social 
scientists to engage in quantitative analysis. He highlights that these scientists are often 
criticized for excluding variables from their analysis that are difficult to measure. The 
difficulty in measuring religion as a quantitative variable, in this view, from a lack of 
qualitative scholastic research that would allow for a proper 'operationalizing' of religion 
as a variable, and the impossibility of 'measuring' religious beliefs as motives for 
political action. 
Fox does identify three ways in which religion can be seen to influence 
international politics. The first way is in the religious view and beliefs of policy makers 
and their constituents. The second is that religion can provide legitimacy in supporting or 
critiquing governmental actions and policies domestically and abroad. The third rests in 
the reality that many religious conflicts and phenomena proliferate into international 
issues.37 If one accepts Fox's assessments of how religion influences international 
political phenomena, it becomes clear that the role religious groups play in shaping U.S. 
policy is in need of greater analysis. Is a fundamentalist movement at work in the U.S. 
policy formation system, and what characterizes if it is? 
Breaching the Gap 
Bringing Religion Back In 
Realist analysis may arguably be the most appropriate theory method for 
understanding the international environment and the primacy of the state in the 
international system. However, it misses the importance of domestic determinants in how 
37
 Ibid, 59. 
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the state develops its policies. Mearsheimer and Walt provide a clear exemplification of 
the theoretical space interest groups occupy in the explanation of domestic policy 
determinants. What they miss is the value of an ideological framing of political action in 
mobilizing the population to action. Moreover, their work is premised on the assumption 
of apathy on the part of the population in terms of the extension of pro-Israel policy. 
They miss the reality of pro-Israel opinion bias among the Christian Right, which is 
likely caused by the Christian Zionsits' ability to shape the public discourse. This project 
aims at illustrating that point. How does the Christian Zionist movement mobilize the U.S. 
public from being generally but quiescently supportive of Israel, to a place of agency aimed 
at influencing policy formation? 
In the work, "Religious Fundamentalisms and Global Conflict", Scott Appleby 
analyzes the trend towards fundamentalist movements, and argues that fundamentalism is 
characterized by a desire to connect with spiritual roots, it capitalizes on the concept of 
minority status by calling for return to "traditional values" from the fringe. Appleby 
rejects the notion that fundamentalisms are either technically new religious movements or 
orthodox, conservative or traditional expressions of religious faith. Rather, he sees them 
as new approaches to existing religious traditions, that center on the concept of 
revivalism. In discussing the Christian Right in American politics, Appleby emphasizes 
the culture war concept that stems from an assault on traditional American values by 
Liberal progressivism. The Christian Right is said to emphasize the negatives of modern 
society and place contemporary dynamics in a false dyad with a romanticized notion of 
America's religious (Christian) past. 
Scott R. Appleby, Religious Fundamentalisms and Global Conflict (Ithaca: Foreign Policy Association, 
CUP Publishers, 1994). 
20 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides an outline of the existing research on realist understandings 
of pro-Israel U.S. policy and the influence of interest groups on policy construction. It 
also, highlights the gap in that literature that comes from realist dismissals of the role 
religious ideology can play in international relations. It is this space that this thesis seeks 
to fill. The following chapters show that in mobilizing as an interest group, Christian 
Zionists are able to move the pro-Israel public from apathy through a specific process. 
First, they frame their ideological project as a political project. Second, they construct a 
community of believers in that project, from a population who possesses a pro-Israel 
opinion bias. Third, they consistently rearticulate their ideological project's political 
frame while they simultaneously create a spirit of community among the members. 
Finally, they incorporate their community of believers in the ground work of their 
ideological project's political action, making movement members into political actors. 
The following chapter will take up a key issue in Mearsheimer and Walt's 
argument that the Israel-Palestinian issue is one to which American opinion is indifferent. 
The data examined in this chapter illustrates the existing pro-Israel skew of American 
public opinion. Mearsheimer and Walt recognize this skew, but they attribute it to the 
Lobby's capacity to shape public discourse on Israel. Their argument underestimates the 
endemic nature of this opinion among Americans, and wrongly attributes to interest 
group influence what emerges from ideology. 
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CHAPTER II 
PREACHING TO THE CHOIR 
Why do Americans tend to support Israel? 
For decades, various U.S. administrations have sought to use the international 
influence of the U.S. as the source of a peaceful resolution between Israel and the other 
parties at conflict. While the U.S. has tried to maintain the image of an 'honest broker' in 
these peace efforts, criticism has emerged that much of the failures of these attempted 
peace efforts are attributable to the pro-Israel posture of U.S. foreign policy. A large body 
of scholarly research has shown that a pro-Israel posture of U.S. foreign policy can be 
discerned in the high amounts of economic and military aid to Israel, and the use of 
vetoes in the U.N. Security Council to prevent the passage of resolutions critical of Israel. 
Why is U.S. foreign policy pro-Israel? 
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the interests promoted by the Lobby are not just 
opposed to the national interest, they also run contrary to the national sentiment. "Other 
special-interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they 
favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the 
American national interest would otherwise suggest..."39 They assert that "special-
interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when they are committed to a particular 
issue and the bulk of the population is indifferent."40 They argue that this is specifically 
Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel Lobby, 63. 
Ibid, 140. 
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applicable in foreign policy, because the issues are generally ones on which public 
opinion is not engaged. "Policy makers will tend to accommodate those who care about 
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the rest of the 
population will not penalize them."41 They assume this general sense of apathy is present 
in American opinions on Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians. This particular 
assumption explaining the power of the pro-Israel special interest groups seems incorrect 
when examining American public opinion data. Figure 1 illustrates that American public 
opinion tends to favor Israel, especially among individuals who self identify as born 
again. In this light, the influence of the Lobby seems to come from a significant element 
of the population that agrees with their aims, rather than coming from the Lobby's. 
concern for an issue on which Americans are generally unconcerned. 
American Opinions on Israel 




If it is accurate to assume that American public opinion is generally pro-Israel, the 
question remains: What causes public opinion to be pro-Israel? To answer this question, 
four possible sources of pro-Israel sentiments are examined: religious identity, 
religiosity, and political party affiliation. The first explanatory theory argues that 
religious identity determines an individual's level of support for Israel, and produces two 
hypotheses. The argument that religious identity determines the level of an individual's 
support for Israel is the basis for much research examining the relationship of the Jewish 
Diaspora to the state of Israel. As Eizenstat shows, American Jews have a 'particular 
interest' in foreign policy as it relates to the Middle East. The sense of communal 
obligation engendered by Zionist ideology was emphasized by the Israeli government. 
Eizenstat notes, "[Israel's] first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion.. .stressed the need for 
[American Jews] to provide economic, political, and moral support for the fledgling 
Jewish state...Israeli governments expected unquestioning loyalty and full support from 
American Jewry..."42 With a firm relationship between Zionist ideology and support for 
Israel among American Jews, the first hypothesis can be constructed. HI: Jewish 
Americans will have a higher level of support Israel than non-Jews. 
The possible influence of religious identity on level of support for Israel extends 
beyond Jewish identity, and provides the second hypothesis. Christian identity also 
influences levels of support for Israel, specifically among Christians who identify as 
42
 Eizenstat, "Loving Israel, Warts and All," 90. The reality of such, 'unquestioning' support for Israel is 
not accurate. As noted earlier, there is an active and relatively influential movement in the Jewish Left that 
sees pro-Israel policy as being opposed to what the Lobby strives to create. Favorability ratings of Israeli 
policy regarding settlements and security are steadily declining among Diaspora and Israeli Jews. 
Contributions to 'traditional' Zionist organizations are down and donations to NGOs and aid programs 
continue to rise. Voices from the Jewish Left have struggled unflaggingly to expose what they see as a bias 
in Media sources that skew reporting in favor of Israeli policies they find reprehensible. But, again, the 
shift in public opinion has not manifested any change in the project of Jewish organizational elements of 
the Lobby, or in the U.S.'s pro-Israel policy regime. 
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'Born Again,' and are classifiable as Christian Zionists. The importance of 'Born Again' 
identity in terms of support for Israel can be found in the ideology of Christian Zionism. 
If this relationship is significant, one can expect to see 'Born Again' identity as 
influencing support for Israel. 
H2: Born Again Christians will have a higher level of Support for Israel than non-
Born Again Christians. 
The second explanatory theory examines the impact of an individual's level of 
religiosity on their support for Israel. This theory also relies on the ideological 
foundations of Zionism and Christian Zionism, but argues that the individual's level of 
commitment to his/her religion predicts their level of support for Israel. This theory 
suggests that elite cues from religious leaders have the power to cause shifts in the 
political opinions of their parishioners. This theory is one of the principle arguments of 
Mearsheimer and Walt, in discussing the power of the Israel Lobby, and is the primary 
research question of Jeremy Mayer in his article.43 They assert that the ability of 
religious leaders to affect changes in public opinion increases as church attendance 
increases. If the argument of Mearsheimer and Walt and the findings of Mayer are 
correct, higher levels of religiosity will coincide with higher levels of support for Israel. 
H3: As levels of religiosity increase, support for Israel will also increase. 
The third explanatory theory examines the relationship between political party 
affiliation and support for Israel. Haija argues that Christian Zionists constitute the 
largest voting block in the Republican Party.44 The power of Christian Zionists is 
increased, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, because of their alliance with the Neo-
43
 Mayer, "Christian Fundamentalist and Public Opinion Toward the Middle East." 
Haija, "Christian Zionism in the US Elections and Policy." 
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Conservative movement within the Republican Party. The Neo-Conservative movement 
is committed to the goals of regional hegemony for Israel, and the development of 
democratic states in the Middle East, which is presently composed of regimes generally 
hostile to both the United States and Israel. The neo-Conservatives view the national 
interest as being furthered by a pro-Israel policy. If this theory is correct Republican 
Party membership will serve as a predictor of higher levels of support for Israel. H4: 
Republicans will have a higher level of support for Israel than non-Republicans. 
Testing the Theories: 
This chapter examines these explanatory theories through OLS multivariate 
regression of public opinion and demographic information. The data set used for this 
analysis is the ABC News/Washington Post Poll, April 2002 (ICPSR 3433).45 The cases 
of the data set are 1250 individual telephone surveys. The survey aims at producing a 
sample representative of the American population. Households for inquiry in the survey 
were selected using random-digit dialing. To maintain the random nature of the survey, 
individual respondents were selected using the "most recent birthday" sampling method. 
The universe of the study is persons aged 18 years of age or older, residing within the 
contiguous 48 United States. 
Variable Definition and Measurement: 
Dependent Variable: 
Before conducting statistical analysis to determine the source of American 
support for Israel, it is necessary to properly identify the variables that correspond to the 
explanatory theories, and define key terms. The dependent variable, or object of analysis, 
45
 TNS Intersearch, ABC News/Washington Post Poll, April 2002 (ICPSR 3433). 
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in this study is Support for Israel. Defining and measuring levels of support is extremely 
difficult to do. What qualifies as support? Since this study does not look at material 
support in the form of financial donations, or votes for specific candidates. Support for 
Israel in this study, as in the ABC Poll, is defined as the placing of responsibility for the 
outbreak of violence with the Palestinians. It is measured on a range of 1 to 5. The value 
1 indicates the respondent believes Israel is most responsible for violence, 2 indicates 
Israel is somewhat responsible, 3 indicates both sides are equally responsible, 4 indicates 
the Palestinians are somewhat responsible, and 5 indicates Palestinians are most 
responsible for violence. 
Mean =3.6384n 
Std. Dev. = 1 . 
27611D 
N =1,073 
2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Support for Israel 
Figure 2 
As noted earlier, Americans are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel with 58.7 
percent of respondents placing the responsibility for violence on the Palestinians. The 
histogram in Figure 2, illustrates how the responses fit against a normal curve. In 
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analysis of Support for Israel, an arithmetic mean of 3.6384 is found, indicating average 
support for Israel is just above the median value of 3. The graph shows the data is 
unimodal, with a clear positive skew. The mode of the data is 5, and falls beyond one 
standard deviation of the mean. This might be problematic in using the mean for 
analysis. However, most of the data points fall within 1 standard deviation of the mean, 
indicating the mean is the appropriate measure of central tendency, and associated 
problems would therefore be minimal. 
Difference In Support for Israel 
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This study seeks to determine the relationship between five independent variables 
and Support for Israel. The first independent variable of this inquiry is Jewish identity, 
and will test the first explanatory theory. For the purposes of this study, Jewish-ness is 
defined as respondents who identified themselves as Jewish when asked about their 
religious identity. Non-Jews are coded with the value 0, n order to serve as the dummy 
variable, and Jews are coded as 1. Jews composed only 1.7% of the sample, 21 
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respondents out of 1207. Figure 3, illustrates the mean difference in Support for Israel 
between non-Jews and Jews. Non-Jews had a mean level of Support for Israel at 3.6236, 
while Jews had a mean level of Support for Israel at 4.3810. Based on this graph, there 
seems to be a clear positive relationship between this independent variable and the 
dependent variable. In order to determine if this relationship is significant, it is necessary 
to conduct a Difference of Means Test, to determine significance. 
For this independent variable, it is necessary to conduct an Independent Samples 
T-Test, because this analysis examines whether or not the mean levels of Support for 
Israel between non-Jews and Jews differ significantly. In conducting the Independent 
Samples T-Test, one must look first at the output for the Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances, to determine whether or not the variances of Support for Israel between non-
Jews and Jews are distributed equally. Levene's test produces an F score of 10.267 
which is significant at the .001. Because Levene's test produced a significance score 
below the .05 value, one must assume that the variances for the two groups are not equal. 
Given that equal variances between non-Jews and Jews are not assumed, the 
second line of the Independent Samples T-Test produces a t-score of -4.556, the absolute 
value of which is well above the 1.96 critical value necessary for significance on a two 
tailed test, and is significant at the .001 level. This indicates that mean difference 
(-.75738) between the two groups is significant, and would only be attributable to chance 
or error less than 1 time out of 1000. The hypothesis for this variable holds that: Jewish 
Americans will have higher levels of Support for Israel than non-Jews. 
46
 This value mirrors the American Jewish population as reported in the CIA World Fact Book, 2008 
edition. The question is flawed however, as there may be a relationship between Jews who don't 
understand the Jewish identity to necessarily be a religious identity and those Jews who would be less 
supportive of Israel (or would reject the premise of such classification altogether) as defined by the scope 
of this analysis. 
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The second independent variable of this study is the respondent's identity as a 'Born 
Again' Christian. This variable also operates to test the first explanatory hypothesis. For 
the purposes of this study, Born Again Christians is defined as those respondents who 
identified as being part of a Protestant Christian denomination that identifies as Born 
Again. Non-Born Again Christians are coded as 0, to serve as the dummy variable, and 
Born Again Christians are coded as 1. 
Percentage of Christian Respondents who 
identify as "Born Again" 
66.3 
33.7 
Born Again Christians • Non-Born Again Christians 
Figure 4 
Figure 4 shows that Born Again Christians constitute a large percentage of all Christians 
included in the analysis, 33.7%, 407 cases out of a total of 1207. Figure 5, on the 
following page, shows the differences of mean Support for Israel between non-
Born Again Christian and Born-Again Christians. Non-Born Again Christians had a 
mean support level of 3.4554, while Born Again Christians had a mean support level of 
3.9918. Based on the mean differences illustrated in the graph, a clear positive 
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relationship is suggested. In order to determine whether the difference of means between 
Non-Born Again Christians and Born Again Christians is significant, it is again necessary 
to conduct an Independent Samples Means Test. 
Again, the Independent Samples Means Test is used because this study is 
interested in determining the significance of the differences in means of Support between 
two groups, non-Born Again Christians and Born Again Christians. In analyzing the 
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Figure 5 
Test for Equality of Variances. The test produces an F score of 37.288, which is 
significant at the .001 level. Because the significance is less than .05, equal variances 
between the two groups are not assumed. Given that equal variances are not assumed, 
the second line of SPSS output for the Independent Samples Means Test produces a t-
score of -7.004, which is well above the 1.96 critical value for a two-tailed test, and is 
31 
significant at the .001 alpha level. This indicates that the difference of means between 
the two groups, -.53636, is significant and that difference would be due to chance or error 
less than 1 time out of 1000. The hypothesis for this variable holds that: Born Again 
Christians will have a higher level of Support for Israel than non-Born Again 
Christians. 
This is extremely important for the project of this study because it is from Born 
Again Christians that the Christian Zionist movement constructs its community of 
believers. Born Again Christians are by nature evangelical Protestants. The concept of 
'born again' comes out of an Evangelical huermenutic of scriptural interpretation. The 
Christian Right is composed of Born Again Evangelicals. It is the scriptural heurmenutic 
that offers the access point by which the Christian Zionist movement increases its 
membership. 
Religiosity's Affect on Support for Israel 
R Sq Linear = 0.006 
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The third independent variable for this study is Religiosity, and tests the second 
explanatory theory. For the purposes of this study, religiosity is defined as frequency of 
religious service attendance.47 As this data is interval, values for religiosity are coded on 
a range of 0-3. A value of 0 indicates the respondent never attends religious services, and 
therefore has no religiosity. The value 1 represents individuals who attend services less 
than twice per month, 2 represents individuals who attend services at least twice per 
month, and 3 represents individuals who attend services at least once a week, 3 classifies 
as highly religious. This variable has an N of 1193 valid cases. The mean for this 
variable is 1.8312, which indicates that Christian Americans, on average, are fairly 
religious. 
Figure 6, on the proceeding page, is a scatter plot for religiosity with a line of best 
fit. The regression line produced suggests a positive relationship between religiosity and 
Support for Israel. With a causal relationship suggested in the graph, it is necessary to 
conduct a means test to determine the variable's significance. Because this variable looks 
at the mean value of one variable, it is necessary to use a One-Sample Means Test to see 
if the mean value for religiosity differs significantly from a hypothetical/test value. The 
test value of this analysis is 0, this will allows for the determination of whether or not the 
mean of religiosity differs significantly from value indicating a respondent is non-
religious. The SPSS output for the One-Sample Means Test on religiosity generates a 
t-score of 65.171, well above the 1.96 critical value of a two-tailed test, and is significant 
47
 Defining religiosity as simply religious service attendance is a gross over-simplification of what 
constitutes religiosity. A more complete picture of religiosity would include frequency of prayer, scripture 
reading, listening and/or watching religious programming, religious group affiliations, attendance at 
religious instruction, and amounts of financial contributions to religious causes. This variable illustrates 
the problems Fox alludes to, which emerge for social scientists when empirical modes of analysis are 
applied to behaviors, beliefs, and opinions that are not necessarily quantifiable. 
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at the .001 alpha level. This indicates that the mean of American religiosity is 
significantly different from 0 or non-religiosity, and that difference would be due to 
chance or error less than 1 time out of 1000. The hypothesis for this variable holds that: 
As religiosity increases, Support for Israel will also increase. 
The fourth independent variable of this study is political party affiliation, 
specifically Republican Party affiliation, and tests the third explanatory theory. This 
analysis examines the impact of Republican Party affiliation on the respondent's level of 
support for Israel. For this study, Republicans are defined as respondents who indicated 
their party identification as being Republican. Republicans constituted 32.6% of 
respondents, with an N of 368 out of 1128. Republicans are coded with the value 1, 
while Democrats and Independents are coded with the value 0. Figure 7, shows 
percentage of respondents grouped by party identification on the DV. 






































Figure 8, illustrates the difference in mean level of support between non-Republicans and 
Republicans. A clear positive relationship is suggested between Republican Party 
membership and support for Israel. It is then necessary to conduct an Independent Means 
Test to determine whether the difference between the groups non-Republicans and 
Republican is significant. 
Difference in Support for Israel Among 
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Figure 8 
In analyzing the Independent Samples Means Test, the first step is to examine the 
output for the Levene's Test of Equality of Variances. The test generates an F score of 
5.571 with a significance score of .018. Because this significance score is below the .05 
level, equal variances between Republicans and non-Republicans should not be assumed. 
Given that equal variances for the two groups are not assumed, the significance test's 
second line of output generates a t-score of -3.831, which has an absolute value greater 
than the 1.96 critical value for a two-tailed test, and is significant at the .001 level. This 
indicates that the mean difference of -.31878 is significant, and the difference observed 
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between Republicans and non-Republicans would be the result of chance or error less 
than 1 time out of 1000. The hypothesis for this variable holds that: Republicans will 
have a higher level of Support for Israel than non-Republicans. 
With a clear understanding of the significance of variables, it is now necessary to 
conduct an OLS Multivariate Regression, to determine whether knowledge of these four 
IVs taken together allows for predictions on the DV, and how much of the variance on 
the DV can be explained by these IVs taken together. 
OLS Regression: 
Table 1 






























An F test indicated that these models were significant at the .001 level. 
Coefficients are unstandardized, with standard errors in parentheses. 




The OLS Regression indicates that the model is significant as a predictor of the 
dependent variable, Support for Israel. The model includes the IVs: Jewish, Born Again, 
Religiosity, and Republican. The ANOVA analysis generates an F score of 14.485, which 
is significant at the .001 alpha level. Therefore, the model is significant. This indicates 
that knowledge of the IVs taken together, will allow for accurate prediction of the DV, 
with error accounting for less than 5 occurrences out of 100. The Adjusted R Square for 
the model is .063, which indicates that the model can explain 6.3% of the variance on 
Support for Israel. Model 1 produces a positive regression line, calculated as: Support 
for Israel = 3.509 +1.029 (Jewish) + .560 (Born Again) + .019(Religiosity) + 
,276(Republican) + error. 
MODEL II: 
The OLS Regression indicates that this model is a significant predictor of the 
dependent variable, support for Israel. The model includes the IVs: Jewish, Born Again, 
and Republican. The ANOVA analysis indicated that an F score of 23.464 was generated, 
which is significant at the .001 alpha level. Therefore, this model is significant. This 
means that knowledge of these three IVs taken together, allows for prediction of the DV 
support for Israel, and that those predictions would be attributable to chance or error less 
than 1 time out of 1000. The model generated an Adjusted R Square of .063, which 
indicates it explains 6.3% of the variance in the DV, support for Israel. The model 
produces a positive regression line, calculated as: Support for Israel = 3.352 + 
.980(Jewish) + .572(Born Again) + .272(Republican) + error. 
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Jews scored .980 greater than non-Jews, holding all other independent variables 
constant. The magnitude of this variable is somewhat high given Jewish Identity 
accounts for more than 1/4 of the range of Support for Israel. However, Jews accounted 
for only 1.87% of total respondents and were concentrated in the top 2% of cases. The 
ability of this religious identity group to skew the results is limited. The variable 
generated a t-score of 3.489, and is significant at the .001 alpha level. 
Born Again Christians scored .572 greater than non-Born Again Christians, 
holding all other independent variables constant. This variable has a fairly high 
magnitude, considering the range of value range of 4 on the DV and the high number of 
individuals in the sample and the population who classify as Born Again. The IV 
generated a t-score of 6.890, well above the 1.96 critical value, and is significant at the 
.001 alpha level. 
Republicans scored .272 more than non-Republicans, holding all other 
independent variables constant. The magnitude of this IV is moderate at best. It 
accounts for a minimal amount of change in the range of 4 on the dependent variable, 
despite the fact that 1/3 of respondents identify as Republicans. The IV generated a t-
score of 3.294, well above the 1.96 critical value level for a two-tailed test, and is 
significant at the .001 alpha level. 
Conclusion 
Based on the findings of this analysis some generalizations can be made. First, 
American public opinion is overwhelmingly pro-Israel. Second, based on the OLS 
regression, the most significant factors that allow researchers to predict an individual's 
level of support for Israel are their identity as a Jewish American or a Born Again 
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Christian. Researchers who examine the relationship between American Jews and Israel, 
and so-called Christian Zionists and Israel, seem to have their research validated by such 
analysis. For researchers like Mearsheimer and Walt, who look at the power of interest 
groups in shaping U.S. policy in regards to Israel, this study raises a question of temporal 
antecedence. Are these interest groups powerful because they can influence public 
opinion, or are they powerful because their advocacy on the issue mirrors the sentiment 
of the population? The data seems to suggest a clear pro-Israel bias that was in operation 
prior to the advent of Christian Zionist lobbying, but not the foundation of its ideological 
premise. In this sense, what we may see from the Christian Zionist lobby in terms of 
attempts to shape public discourse is a situation where the Reverends are essentially 
"preaching to the choir." The following chapter will examine the ideology of Christian 
Zionism and the manner in which this ideology is framed as a political project. In doing 
so, it will become clear how this process of "preaching to the choir" operates to increase 




THE IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT 
Only in America 
America has always been anomalous when considering the impact of religion on 
the political process and the elites elected to lead it. Alexis de Tocqueville in 
"Democracy in America", is clear in illustrating the defining role religion plays in 
solidifying American social structure.48 Moreover, religious sensibilities played major 
roles in American public policy throughout U.S. history. Both sides of the abolition 
debate were framed in religious ideology. Federal conflicts with American Indians, the 
Temperance Movement, and much American internationalism and U.S. foreign policy 
were also reflective of the religious nature of American society. However, the post-War 
period characterized by extreme shifts in the political landscape and in American society 
at large, was also characterized by what some perceived as a shift toward secularization. 
This shift characterized by the feminist movements, drug culture, anti-establishment 
liberalism, the legalization of abortion, and political efforts to secularize the public sphere 
created the political environment necessary for the emergence of a so-called Christian 
Fundamentalist movement and its political wing, the Christian Right. The emergence of 
this movement was a boon for U.S. anti-communist policies, because the communist 
threat was understood and articulated by this movement to be synonymous with the threat 
of atheistic-secularism/11 
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This Christian fundamentalist movement is characterized by its broad coalition, 
containing various religious branches with differing interpretations of Christian scripture 
and history. Christian fundamentalism is not monolithic, and it is in the nuances of 
beliefs that we find Christian Zionists as a specific group characterized by those beliefs 
that drive their perceptions of and activism for Israel and that separates them from others 
within those coalitions. It is therefore inappropriate to classify Christian fundamentalists 
as Christian Zionists, while it is correct to classify Christian Zionists as a type of 
Christian fundamentalists. This specificity is important to note in examining the 
construction of the Christian Zionist community of believers. As was previously shown, 
an individual's identity as a Born Again Christian is significant as a predictor of the 
respondent's support for Israel. The Evangelicals who compose the Christian Right are 
classifiable as Born Again Christians in the previous chapter. It is from this group of 
Evangelical Christian fundamentalists that Christian Zionists compose their community 
of believers, because of the significance their ideological project would hold in the 
ideology of that type of fundamentalism. 
How can a Christian be a Zionist? 
The driving theory of Christian Zionism is dramatically different from classical 
Zionist theory. According to Gelvin, Zionism is, "broadly defined as Jewish 
nationalism... [which asserts] Jews have the same right to self-determination as other 
peoples."49 This is most certainly true, but Zionism is more than simple nationalism. For 
Gelvin, nationalism is a political movement that emphasizes inclusion in an expanded 
political community, that is bound by shared experience and distinguishing traits.50 
49




However, Zionism is more than simple nationalism. For the purposes of this argument, 
classical Zionist theory is broken into two divergent schools, secular Zionism and 
religious Zionism. This classification is problematic as Zionist theory is extremely 
diverse with significant overlap clearly present in any attempt to classify the theory as 
purely religious or purely political. What this study typifies as secular Zionism is best 
exemplified the Zionist theory articulated by Shlomo Avineri in The Makings of Modern 
Zionism.51 In this work Avineri traces the intellectual genealogy of Zionist theory 
through the writings of European Jewish scholars struggling to define themselves in the 
post-Enlightenment worldview. 
Avineri argues that Zionism is a product of intellectual liberalism that emerged in 
the wake of the French Revolution, along with the nationalist and socialist movements of 
the latter nineteenth century. The work shows how Jewish intellectuals sought to deal 
with the liberation classical liberalism offered to Jewish citizens with the emergence of 
the notion of equality among individuals and the fear and exclusion nationalist ideologies 
expressed towards Jewish people who refused to blend within the national identity, due in 
large part to the concept of separateness and chosen-ness central to rabbinical Jewish 
identity. Socialism was also problematic because of the anti-religious character that was 
perceived as central to Leninist ideology. Zionism in this view is essentially a political 
phenomenon seeking to provide the freedom guaranteed by liberal society and the 
communal identity guaranteed by nationalism, both of which had failed to truly extend to 
Jewish people, especially the Jewish underclass which was not afforded the opportunities 
available to their cosmopolitan counterparts. A Jewish homeland in Palestine is not the 
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central focus of this Zionism, but rather the principles of self-determination, self-
identification, and political agency. This ideology is remarkably different from 
"religious Zionism", which is much more closely tied to the land in Palestine. 
Religious Zionism is best exemplified in the work of the late Rabbi Arthur 
Hertzberg in his work, The Zionist Idea52. While Hertzberg's work acknowledges the 
influence of the Emancipation of Jews following the French Revolution, the advent of 
classical liberalism, along with the nationalist and socialist movements of the nineteenth 
century in the construction of Zionist ideology, Hertzberg pays specific attention to the 
role messianism played in the formation of Zionist ideology both as a response to 
traditional messianism, and an expression of a new messianism. With its emphasis on the 
historical homeland, and the religious concepts of the return, the end of exile, and the 
coming End of Days, Hertzberg highlights how Zionism emerged as a type of secular 
messianism, as opposed to the nationalism Gelvin presents. 
While Zionism, like other forms of nationalism, would incorporate a historical 
identity located in a specific geography, with a shared cultural history, it was the 
importance of religious identity and the cultural value of Judaism which sets Zionism 
apart from secular nationalisms. Hertzberg notes that this secular nationalism (read 
secular Zionism) moved the expectation of redemption away from the traditional 
understanding of messianism as a "confrontation with G-d.. .to a confrontation with the 
nations." Hertzberg shows that in framing Zionist ideology as a new secular messianism, 
there was significant contention with traditional messianism and religious notions of 
Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (Garden City: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc. and Herzl Press, 1959). 
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Jewish self-understanding. That is to say concepts like chosenness and separateness had 
to be reconciled with the nationalistic impulse to be one nationalized people in a 
collection of liberal nations. It is from the conflict between the two types of messianism, 
and the conflict between traditional self-definitions as Jews, and the Zionist self-
definition as one nation among many, that Hertzberg presents the theoretical foundations 
of religious Zionist ideology. 
It is important to note that Zionist ideology, both political and religious, exist on 
spectrums ranging from far left to far right. By the founding of the state of Israel 
Zionism as an ideology is less concerned with concepts like agency and self-
determination, and much more concerned with the security the State of Israel can offer to 
its Jewish citizens. Both secular and religious Zionists recognize a need for a Jewish 
state given the history of anti-Semitism and political violence that has characterized 
Jewish encounters with gentile society as early as the Babylonian exile. This ideology 
morphs into political action, which is characterized by expansionist Israeli policies, 
including militaristic hegemony over the Occupied Palestinian Territories, settlement 
founding within the OPTs, the construction of the Separation Wall beyond the 1967 
borders creating a de facto land annexation within the OPTs, and Israeli control of greater 
Jerusalem in its entirety, not because of the religious significance of the space but 
because of the need to ensure the protection of Israeli citizens. 
Religious Zionism also exists in a spectrum, containing broad diversity of 
interpretations of the modern state of Israel. This diversity is shown in Aviezer 
Ravitsky's work, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. He highlights 
Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996). 
44 
leftist religious radicalism that ranges from radical anti-Zionism of Ultra-Orthodox Jews 
who reject the modern state because of its secular origins, to the 'redemption' oriented 
messianic movement articulated by Rabbi Abraham Kook and the Gush Emunim 
movement, who emphasized that the creation of a modern political state would be a 
divinely ordained event, bring about the advent of Messiah to redeem the land and the 
Jewish people, and lead to the forgiveness of sins that had caused the period of exile. 
Religious Zionism also has a far right, a radical religious element that sees it as a spiritual 
right and obligation of Jews to occupy all of the territory held in the biblical period. They 
recognize their right, and spiritual obligation to use violence to forcibly occupy the 
territory and redeem it from gentile possession through removal or eradication. 
Regardless of the theoretical construction of Zionism, the ideology is consistent in 
that it emphasizes the global Jewish community as part of the nation of Israel. Its 
socialist elements impart a sense of duty within the community to provide money to the 
Zionist effort and promote a state that allows for Jewish agency and self-determination. 
It is important to remember that neither Avineri's political Zionism, nor Hertzberg's 
secular messianism inherent in Zionism emphasized the construction of a Zionist state in 
the territory of Palestine. That particular course of action was emphasized the Zionism of 
Theodore Herzl, which combined the political and messianic concepts of Zionism and 
merged them with an ideological attachment to the geography of Palestine and called 
upon the Jewish community to increase settlement of the land, through the 'redemption' 
of the Jewish homeland. For Herzl, a Jewish state is necessary because of the plight of 
Jews in the Diaspora, who were subject to institutional anti-Semitism. Herzl understood 
Jewish identity to be a national identity, requiring a nationalist enterprise to meet the 
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needs of the Jewish people. He acknowledges religious and social identities to matter, 
but only in terms of broader nationality. Zionism in this form is most importantly about 
agency, but a close second is the historical homeland in Palestine. In Herzl's view, it was 
the Zionist obligation of all Jews to emigrate to Israel as, "a Jew is better, richer, fuller, 
and ultimately more secure in Israel than anywhere else."55 
Christian Zionism has little to do with classical Jewish Zionism; however, it is 
politically aligned with the far-Right of both streams of Zionist thought. Christian 
Zionism is a uniquely Christian invention, that is based in a specific understanding of 
sacred time called dispensationalism, a unique biblical hermeneutic that emphasizes the 
importance of Bible prophecy, and that places the State of Israel in a teleology that 
arguably has as much more to do with Christianity than it does with Judaism. 
What makes a Christian Zionist? 
Unlike many other observers, I blame much of the Middle East conflict, not on 
misunderstandings, not on a failure to communicate, not on an inability to compromise, 
but on evil — pure and simple. And evil, I believe, can only be overcome with G-d's love 
and blessing, and it can only be resisted by man through prayer and force. 
Joseph Farah, Pray for the Peace of Israel 
Christian Zionism exists as a form of Protestant Christian fundamentalism, which 
grew out of the Evangelical Great Awakening of the 19th Century. While both forms of 
fundamentalism are a byproduct of the Evangelical movement, Christian Zionist theology 
is its own unique strand, with theological roots extending much further. Marc Schoeni 
provides a clear definition of the philosophy of Christian Zionism and its historical and 
theological roots. He suggests that the specific type of theology, which characterizes 
Christian Zionism, emerged prior to the development of modern Jewish Zionism.57 He 
55
 Eizenstat, "Loving Israel, Warts and All," 90. 
55
 Mark Schoeni, "The Roots of Christian Zionism," Theological Review, 26 no.l (2005). 
57
 Ibid, 3. 
46 
traces the theological roots of Christian Zionism through the evangelical minister John 
Nelson Darby, and highlights the development of this theological position in the latter 
19th century. 
Schoeni holds that what is classified as Christian Zionism is best understood as a 
product of a specific type of Protestantism, and that it rests on specific beliefs about the 
nature of the Bible and the validity of biblical interpretation. He classifies Protestantism 
into three categories: classical, spiritual/enthusiastic, and accommodated. Classical 
Protestantism is best understood as the theology of the 'magisterial' Reformers, and is 
theologically understood as composed of the two reform schools, Lutheran and Calvinist. 
Classical Protestant theology is characterized by its evangelical drive, confirmation of the 
validity of divine revelation, and what he terms the Scripture principal. According to the 
Scripture principle, 
"Scripture is not valued in and of itself, but inasmuch as it is the G-d-chosen 
vehicle of the Gospel. The constant return to Scripture is the means by which we 
receive this message ever anew from without, rather than reading it off our own 
experiences or insights. But the Bible exists for the sake of Christ, not Christ for 
the sake of the Bible. The authority of the Scripture is secondary to that of G-d in 
Christ."58 
In the Spiritualist branch of Protestantism the role of the scripture is more 
prominent. He argues that this branch has a strongly developed Biblicism, the scriptural 
encounter is the one by which the individual encounters the divine and facilitates the 
spiritual conversion. This Biblicism is coupled with a complete rejection of external 
authority on spiritual matters, the personal encounter the reader experiences with the 
divine while engaging the text allows him to interpret the text as the divine intends. The 
interpretation is primary, and it occurs without any definitive theological oversight. 
58
 Ibid, 7. 
47 
In discussing accommodated Protestantism, Schoeni notes that this brand of 
religiosity emerged in response to the advent of modernity and that much of its character 
is shaped by democratic principles. He shows that Christian Zionism is not necessarily a 
product of accommodated Protestantism, as its theological support for Jewish Zionism is 
not necessarily a "Zionist" ideology as framed by various branches of classical Jewish 
Zionist theory. 
Instead, he argues that Christian Zionism grew out of the Spiritualist type of 
Protestantism, and is a product of eschatological enthusiasm and Biblicism. He shows 
how the eschatological enthusiasm that characterizes Christian Zionism places its roots in 
the foundation of Christianity, citing the presence of the apocalyptic texts in the canon, 
and its presence throughout the life of the faith. He traces the resurgence of chialistic 
(millenarian) worldviews with the coming of the Crusades. These beliefs were 
articulated by Joachim of Fiore, and focused on three spiritual ages: that of the Father, the 
age of Christ, and the coming age of the Spirit, which would usher in the kingdom of G-d 
and Christ's millennial reign. 
In the 17l century, millenarianism split into two branches: postmillennialism and 
premillennialism. He states that postmillennialism was present among more moderate 
millennialists and is characterized by its view of continuity between the present age and 
the coming one. The coming age would come 'without any dramatic end to history'59 
and would be characterized by spiritual revival and evangelism. He states that 
premillennialism is "pessimistic with regard to history and sees the institutional 
church.. .as beyond redemption."60 This concern with millennialism is termed 
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dispensationalism. Dispensationalists believe that time is divinely ordained towards a 
specific teleology. In this worldview, the different periods are characterized by different 
relations between G-d and human beings. Christian Zionists accept dispensationalism, 
and regard the formation of the modern State of Israel as one of the key events in the final 
dispensation in which Christ will return to earth. 
The Ideological Framing 
Christian Zionism is foundationally a theopolitical ideology, whose adherents 
understand their theological origins to affect political purposes. It is characterized by the 
belief in the teleological need for a political Israel, composed of Jews, in the biblical 
geography of Ancient Israel, along with a religious community practicing traditional pre-
rabbinic temple worship, in a restored temple, on the Temple Mount, in order for Jesus 
Christ to return and establish his kingdom on Earth. Christian Zionist political action is 
aimed at providing material, financial, and political support for the state of Israel, and for 
rightist Israeli policies aimed at expanding territorial hegemony for the state of Israel and 
complete sovereignty over Jerusalem. This political action is accomplished through 
lobbying activities by organized political action committees, cues from religious elites, 
the promotion of candidates who espouse a pro-Israel stance and direct financial 
assistance to rightist Zionist groups in the U.S. and in Israel and for increased settlement 
efforts in the OPTs. 
Gary Burge examines the evolution of Christian Zionist attitudes and the 
relationship that has developed between the movement and the State of Israel.61 Burge 
highlights that the movement is a dynamic philosophy that grew out of the 
Dispensationalist theology of the late nineteenth century. He defines Christian Zionism 
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as a movement which blends religion and politics, and interprets biblical faithfulness in 
terms of fidelity to Israel's future. 
Burge identifies five beliefs that characterize Christian Zionist ideology that rest 
on interpretations of G-d's covenant with men, the role of the Church in G-d's 
teleological design, the principle of blessing Israel, the role of Bible prophecy, and the 
role of the State of Israel in divine eschatology. Christian Zionist interpretations of the 
divine covenants rest on the belief that the Abrahamic Covenant is eternal and 
unconditional. Their belief places a primacy on the Covenant between Abraham and G-d 
over the 'New Covenant' framed in the Christian interpretations of Jesus' ministry, 
crucifixion, and resurrection. The Christian Zionist interpretation conflicts with 
traditional Christian theology by asserting that the Church does not replace Israel as 
G-d's primary instrument on Earth, nor have periods of so-called unfaithfulness of the 
Jews terminated the land grant given to the Jews in the Abrahamic Covenant. The 
second tenant of Christian Zionist belief emphasizes this point. To Christian Zionists the 
Church and the New Covenant are essentially a supplemental addendum resulting from 
Jewish unfaithfulness, but after the rapture of the faithful Israel and the Jews will again 
be G-d's primary agent in the world. 
The third theological tenet of Christian Zionism rests on the promise in Gen 
12.363, that G-d would bless those who bless Israel and curse those that curse Israel. In 
the perspective of Christian Zionists this is a binding divine norm for Christians. They 
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interpret this verse as both a promise and as an obligation to engage in pro-Israel policy 
advocacy to ensure that they as a community of believers, and by proxy the U.S., benefit 
from G-d's special relationship with the Jews. This ideology is the source of the 
Christian Zionist construction of the national interest. It is from this theological 
perspective that efforts to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict need to be understood. Efforts to raise capital investments, to 
influence congress through lobbying efforts, voter mobilization, and direct influence on 
the President all, in the view of Christian Zionists, are ways in which the Christian 
Zionist movement seek to 'bless' Israel. 
The fourth tenant of Christian Zionist belief rests on the value of Bible Prophecy. 
This belief holds that certain Biblical texts are intended to be read as a roadmap to 
coming events. Christian Zionists reject mainstream Liberal Christian theology that 
argues that these prophetic texts refer to contemporary or immediately pending events at 
the time of their writing, or are theological beliefs meant to be accepted by second 
century Jewish and Christian communities. In this rejection, they also accept that there is 
a limited group of biblical scholars who possess the appropriate interpretive hermeneutic, 
therefore affirming a sense of authority and authenticity that is characteristic of 
fundamentalist ideology. This monopoly on orthodoxy provides serious influence and 
authority to those religious elites who provide proper prophetic interpretation, and 
critiques on political efforts and policy regarding Israel. 
The final tenant rests in how Christian Zionists view Israel itself. For Christian 
Zionists, Israel is the key to the final dispensation and the return of Jesus Christ to usher 
in his millennial reign. They view the formation of the modern State of Israel as the 
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catalyst which sparks the teleological countdown expressed in Bible prophecy. They 
interpret the various political phenomena and conflicts that have followed the formation 
of the State of Israel in 1948, as signs by which believers can know they are in the final 
dispensation and the Last Days are pending. When the underpinning ideology and the 
ultimate aims of the movement are observed, it is clear that the efforts of the Christian 
Zionist lobby are classifiable as an ideological project. 
It is important to note that the Christian Zionist movement also articulates an 
image of itself as a political movement and an interpretation of the national interest that is 
entirely political. The Rev. John Hagee, founder and executive director of Christians 
United for Israel (CUFI), one of the most prominent Christian Zionist lobby groups, has 
said that Christian Zionist activities in support of Israel has nothing to do with 
dispensationalist theology, but rather with the political and strategic interest that are 
shared between Israel and the U.S., specifically combating the threat of militant Islam, 
eliminating hostile Arab regimes, and the promotion of democratic value. However, the 
'proof is in the pudding. Analyses of Hagee's sermons on both Israel and Bible 
prophecy interpret the present situation, the need for (American) Christian Activism in 
support of Israel, and strategic threats in terms of Bible prophecy and eschatology. 
Hagee does not preach on bible prophecy without discussing dispensationalist ideology in 
terms of Israel's future and America's responsibility. 
This is the ideology at the heart of their project and the premise for their 
construction of the national interest. This is clearly expressed in Rev. Hagee's speech to 
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the AIPAC Policy Conference in March, 2007. In this speech, Pastor Hagee articulates 
a firm, continuing commitment to the state of Israel by the Christian Zionist movement in 
America. He frames a picture of the contemporary political situation in the region as one 
in which the 'whole world is against Israel,' citing criticism from the U.N. European 
states, and American academes. Moreover, Hagee firmly critiques attempts by mainline 
churches to divest from Israel, and the writings of former President Jimmy Carter. He 
states that CUFI and other like-minded evangelicals have, 'a deep-seated faith-based' 
belief to love Israel, to speak up for Israel, to stand up for Israel, to pray for Israel, and to 
financially support Israel until Israel achieves a just and lasting peace.'6 He enumerates 
some 50 million religious Americans who stand with Christian Zionists in support of 
Israel. In his speech, he argues there is a legitimate threat to Israel's survival in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and its President Ahmadinejad and states that the U.S. must take 
preventative measures to ensure that Iran does not attain nuclear weapons status. Of the 
peace process, Hagee states that, 'the problem is the Arab rejection of Israel's right to 
exist... [that] Israel has no partner for peace... [evidenced by] the blood thirsty embrace 
of a theocratic dictatorship that believes they have a mandate from G-d to kill Christians 
and Jews... [and] the failure of the moderates in the Arab and Muslim world stand up and 
rein in these Islamic extremists.'66 
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The primary objective of this chapter is to illustrate the need for greater analysis 
of the role religious ideology plays in international relations. This is accomplished 
through examining the Christian Zionist movement as a case study. In this section the 
ideological roots of this movement are explored to illustrate its location in broader 
Christian fundamentalist ideology, and clearly distinguish the movement from the various 
schools of Jewish Zionist ideology. The previous chapter identified the pro-Israel of born 
again evangelicals. This chapter identifies such evangelicals as the pool of individuals 
from which the Christian Zionist community of believers is constructed. Moreover, 
analysis of Christian Zionist ideology and its origins supports the causal relationship 
theorized in the previous chapter. The following chapter examines how this pro-Israel 




THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF IDEOLOGY 
Ideological Rent 
Mearsheimer and Walt show that a major goal of the Lobby is the continuation of 
a special relationship between the U.S. and Israel, which is characterized in large part by 
economic subsidization of Israel. This subsidization comes from grants, loans, and 
defense contracts. This chapter builds on their analysis of this relationship, but analyses 
the motivations for the continuation of this relationship in terms of ideology. The first 
part looks at the main sources of Israel's ideologically based funding in the U.S. 
government, Diaspora Jews. The second section looks exclusively as Christian Zionist 
fundraising and activities in support of Israel. It will show that Christian Zionist steadfast 
love and support for Israel is extremely valuable, and is a relationship the Israeli 
government continues to foster as Diaspora support wanes. 
In the study of the Middle East, scholarship on the economic structures of the 
states in the region has emphasized the importance of rent in the development process. 
Rent can be defined as state revenues not acquired from taxation, usually from external 
sources in the form of trade revenues from natural resource commodities or from foreign 
aid. A rentier state is any state that relies on such external sources for a significant 
amount of its total revenues. Gelvin notes that the Middle East is unique in that all of the 
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states in the region "are reliant on income derived from rent to a greater or lesser 
extent."67 As a result, all of these states can be analyzed in terms of rentier theory. 
As much discussion of rentierism focuses on resource commodities, like oil, how 
do states without large amounts of resource wealth accrue rent? This question certainly 
applies to the state of Israel, which lacks valuable natural resources. Moreover, Israel 
operates with high levels of deficits. Israel, despite a relatively high GDP, remains 
reliant on foreign aid to cover its costs and fund programs. Israel is a rentier state in that 
it relies heavily on foreign economic and military aid and private donations to operate. 
Much of this revenue is available to Israel because of its ideological value for those who 
provide the rent. This chapter will examine Israel as a rentier state, focusing on the 
ideological sources of funding from the U.S. government, the Jewish Diaspora, and the 
Christian Zionist movement. 
The primary source of Israel's rent, at present, is the U.S. government. The flow 
of aid to Israel from the U.S. comes in military aid, loans, and grants. U.S. aid to Israel 
stands at approximately 3.6 billion dollars annually. According to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the FY08 requested funding amount for military aid to Israel is $2.4 
billion.68 The U.S. provides an additional $1.2 billion for civil economic aid. The 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, totals U.S. aid to Israel since its 1949 
founding at $107.9 billion.69 Their totaling includes 'conservative' accountings of aid for 
military grants, economic grants, refugee assistance,70 and the support of the American 
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Schools and Hospitals Abroad program. Their total also includes special Department of 
Defense grants for specific programs not included in normal earmarking, interest accrued 
on cash grants paid to Israel prior to the start of a new fiscal year, and other grants and 
endowments. 
The rent relationship between the U.S. and Israel is designed at all levels to 
maximize rent incomes for Israel. As scholar Stephen Zunes notes, the U.S.-Israel 
relationship is uniquely structured to increase revenues for Israel. He cites as proof of a 
special relationship in aid the facts that since 1992, the U.S. offers of annual loan 
guarantees of $2 billion, that all loans to Israel have eventually been forgiven by 
congress, and that since 1984 U.S. policy has been to set U.S. aid to Israel at or above the 
annual debt repayments expected from Israel.71 Zunes goes on to discuss the manner in 
which funds are distributed to Israel: 
Unlike other countries, which receive aid in quarterly installments, aid to Israel 
since 1982 has been given in a lump sum at the beginning of the fiscal year, 
leaving the U.S. government to borrow from future revenues. Israel even lends 
some of this money back through U.S. treasury bills and collects the additional 
interest.72 
With such a clear record of financial commitment to Israel by the U.S. government, the 
question becomes, why? What is it about Israel that requires such strong and consistent 
financial ties from the U.S.? The question essentially comes down to how policy actors 
in the U.S. view the state of Israel and their commitment to balancing the Soviets during 
the Cold War period, and curtailing the expansion of Islamist political movements and 
expanding U.S. hegemony and securing access to Middle East oil resources. While these 
71
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motivations are obviously politically motivated, there is an inherent ideological position 
being advocated and supported materially by such support. 
The most pronounced source of ideological rent for Israel comes from the Jewish 
Diaspora stemming heavily from the school of Zionism articulated by Herzl. The agency 
emphasized by Herzl, centered on a return of Diaspora Jews to their ancestral homeland 
to contribute to the settlement effort. Many Jews, especially in the U.S., were 
uncomfortable with and unwilling to permanently settle in Israel. The result was an 
accommodation from the government of Israel. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
emphasized the need for American Jews to provide economic, political, and moral 
support for the Jewish state. The result was a source of rent that would be sustainable as 
long as there was an Israel composed of Jews and a community of Jews living outside of 
it. 
The rent Israel received from the Diaspora was the most important aid it received 
during its formative years leading up to the 1967 war. Samuel Halperin argues that the 
Zionist movement was primarily a fundraising effort.73 He notes that by the 1940's 
Zionist fundraising efforts accumulated $100 million annually. At present, donations 
from U.S. Jews to Israel are on the decline. The trend emerged in the 1990s when 
donations fell from $275 million in 1985 to $217 in 1997. As Eizenstat notes, this is 
largely do the rise in opposition to Israeli land policies and treatment of the Palestinians 
from American Jews.vm While the flow of funds from the American Diaspora to the 
government of Israel and its program efforts have decreased, overall donations to non-
" Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1961). 
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governmental agencies and programs have continued to steadily increase continuing at a 
rate of approximately $2 billion. 
Blessing Israel 
Another major source of ideological rent for Israel is the Christian Zionist 
movement, which has become closely aligned with Israeli government elites and pro-
Israel efforts by elements of the Jewish Diaspora. This is an important element of this 
interest group's capacity for influence. The tools of influence Mearsheimer and Walt 
identify for interest groups are lobbying, campaign contributions, voter mobilization, and 
influencing public discourse. The tools of the interest group are then applied in the 
process of influencing through pressure on policy actors, the presence of ideological 
sympathizers throughout the bureaucracy of government, and social outreach activities in 
the public sector. The Christian Zionist interest group, like the rest of the Lobby, is 
particularly effective in how they use these tools and impact policy formation. In terms 
of lobbying, the Christian Zionists are effective because of their influence within 
Republican Party politics and because of their willingness to cooperate with other non-
Christian pro-Israel lobbying groups, especially AIPAC. Several prominent policy actors 
have identified as Christian Zionists, and there is speculation that presidents Ronald 
Reagan and G.W. Bush have expressed Christian Zionist attitudes in their policy 
formation. Movement leaders have also been particularly effective in mobilizing grass 
roots activism in support of pro-Israel politicians and policies. 
Christian Zionist support for Israel is two fold. As we have seen, it has become a 
prominent participant in the Lobby and has provided greater access to Republican policy 
actors for lobbying efforts. In "The Influence of the Christian Right on U.S. Middle East 
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Policy," Stephen Zunes argues that influence rests in mobilization of individuals to vote 
for Republican candidates.74 These candidates in this view are elected with the 
expectation they will continue and increase U.S. material support for Israel. He uses the 
fact that since the emergence of the Evangelical Right, 5 of 7 presidential elections have 
gone to Republican candidates, and had control of the U.S. Senate 8/13 sessions, and at 
time of writing had control of the U.S. House for the previous six years (that control 
ended in the mid-term elections of 2006). This was accomplished by the ability to make 
Evangelicals the most active politically, and most likely to vote. Zunes argues that the 
movement has a de facto leader in President George W. Bush, and that Christian Zionists 
"are, at this point, more significant in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Israel than 
are Jewish Zionists."75 
One primary example comes in discussing the Bush administration's support of 
the Road Map. On May 19, 2003 numerous Christian Zionist leaders sent an open letter 
to the President advising him to tend his pursuit of the Road Map. On CBS' 60 Minutes 
in June of 2003, Rev. Jerry Falwell stated that, "There is nothing that would bring the 
wrath of the Christian public in this country down on this government like abandoning or 
opposing Israel in a critical matter. And when the chips are down Ariel Sharon can trust 
George [W.] Bush to do the right thing every time."76 Another example comes from the 
previous year when the President spoke harshly of Israel military activities in Jenin. The 
response from the Christian Zionists was immediate, organizing a letter writing campaign 
that sent 100,000 letters, calls, and personal visits to government officials in D.C.77 
74
 Zunes, "The Role of the Christian Right," 73. 
75
 Ibid, 76. 
76
 Wagner, "Defining Christian Zionism," 4. 
77
 Zunes, "The Role of the Christian Right," 78. 
60 
The movement is extremely effective in shaping public discourse. This is 
accomplished through political rallies and conferences along with ministry outreach, 
television programs, and publications. Hagee's television ratings are reported at 90 
million viewers, he organizes four large religious tours to Israel, and has hundreds of 
millions of dollars in sales of pro-Israel religious books, videos, and other publications. 
The popular Christian Zionist writer Hal Lindsey's pre-eminent work The Late Great 
Planet Earth, has gone through numerous editions and has sold over 25 million copies. 
His fantasy series, The Left Behind Series, which focuses on life after the rapture, spans 
eleven volumes and has sold over 100 million copies. Perhaps the most important source 
of their capacity to shape public discourse comes from the hundreds of thousands of 
individual churches that align themselves with broader Christian Zionist organizations 
like CUFI. These individual parishes participate in major pro-Israel events organized by 
the larger organizations, but they also keep the pro-Israel message before their 
congregants in weekly sermons, Sunday school lessons, bible studies, etc. These 
ministry outreach efforts are central to the Christian Zionist project in that they provide 
the means for consistent rearticulation of its ideological frame within the community of 
believers, it provides the possibility for membership expansion, and it provides 
oppurtinites for members to actively support Israel, in essence mobilizing the members 
from apathy to agency. 
The Christian Zionist movement is not simply an enabler for Israeli rent in the 
form of foreign and military aid from the U.S. Rather, it is a new, but significant source 
of revenue for Israel itself. This revenue comes from fundraising efforts by broad 
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Christian Zionist umbrella organizations, donations from individual ministries, and craft 
merchandise. No official government totals enumerate the exact contributions, however 
conservative estimates place donations from Christian Zionists at around $500 million. 
In his article for the Israeli Insider, Jonathan Tobin examines the International Christian 
Jewish Fellowship, which is a coalition of Christian Zionist and Jewish Organizations. 
According to Tobin, this one organization contributes $47 million dollars annually to 
Israel, 98% of which comes from Evangelical Christians in small individual donation 
amounts.79 In 2006, the Rev. John Hagee's ministry was able to donate $1 million dollars 
after 1 day of fundraising for Israel. Numerous Christian Zionist televangelist ministries 
sell cheap crafts exported from Israel, offering viewers the chance to support Israel while 
purchasing a small token that will symbolize their connection to the holy land.80 With 
hundreds of ministries in the U.S. alone that identify as Christian Zionists, the flow of 
rent to Israel promises to remain large and to replace some of the revenues lost from 
declining support from the Diaspora. Likewise, it promises to be a long lived source of 
rent given the theological premise on which it is grounded. In their own understanding, 
Christian Zionists are required by G-d to provide aid to Israel, support the settlement of 
Jews on the "frontier" , and lobby their government to maintain a pro-Israel posture; 
they will continue to do this until the return of Jesus Christ. 
It is also important to note an additional source of rent for Israel that is heavily 
tied to ideology, that is rent acquired from the tourism industry. Tourism accounts for 
Jonathan S Tobin, "A pro-Israel group teaches us a lesson about Evangelicals and ourselves," Israeli 
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approximately 1% GDP, or about $3 billion. The tourism industry relies heavily on 
religious pilgrimages and holiday celebrations, which bring Jews and Christians from 
around the world. Tourism is not a new source of rent for Israel, the wealth promised 
by controlling the holy cites of Jerusalem sparked centuries of conflict between Christian 
Europe and the Islamic empires. Tourism occupies a precarious position, with revenues 
highly subject to the political environment. The threat of violence is omnipresent, and 
outbreaks of violence and terrorist attacks cause significant declines in tourism to Israel. 
Conclusion 
While Israel is blessed with significant amounts of rent resources, stemming in 
large part from its ideological value for American foreign policy actors, the Jewish 
Diaspora, and the Christian Zionists, Israel experiences serious difficulties in terms of 
economic and social factors. In the case of the Christian Zionist lobby, we find an 
interest group that possesses significant amounts of access to policy actors, large amounts 
of political capital in voter networks and finances, and rather far reaching influence over 
the culture of ideas surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this light, it is fair to 
say that the Christian Zionist lobby does posses the capacity for influence over policy 
formation and the access points to exercise that capacity. As Mayer shows, the power of 
religious identity is significantly related to public opinions on the conflict. 




Mearsheimer and Walt make the argument that the pro-Israel policy advocated by 
the Lobby undermines the national interest. Their critique has sparked significant debate. 
Ultimately, the question of whether or not this policy runs contrary to the national interest 
depends upon how the national interest is defined. For realist scholars, neo-conservative 
policy actors, and the administration, the national interest is not only to advance the 
relative power of the state, but to advance that power level in light of the expressed 
policy goals of the governing administration. At present, the national interest seems to be 
focused on eliminating the threat of hostile regimes in the region, preventing the rise of 
new Islamist regimes, and eliminating the capacity of terrorist organizations and their 
influence in regional politics. 
The Christian Zionists and the Lobby see their goals as mirroring these identified 
policy goals. However, the national interest for Christian Zionists moves beyond simple 
realpolitik issues into eschatology, teleology, and other concepts that compose their 
ideological project. They include values and beliefs in the national interest that are not 
explainable by realist theories. As discussed earlier Christian Zionists do not define the 
national interest in terms of realpolitick, but in terms of obedience to a divine mandate. 
In their view, the benefits that come from advancing a realist national interest are second 
to the benefits that come from G-d's promise to bless those who bless Israel. While 
many of the policy positions they support have a solid realist self-interested logic, the 
efforts by officials to contain terrorist threats and rogue regimes will not guarantee 
security. Unlike Mearsheimer and Walt, Christian Zionists understand threats from rogue 
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states and terrorist networks to increase without a pro-Israel policy because of divine 
punishment for failing to comply with the divine admonition to bless Israel. They do not 
see the decline in soft power and prestige as a negative result of the pro-Israel policy 
because their ideology frames their obligation of support as a spot of contention with the 
secular world that is to be welcomed, not averted. The ultimate critique of Mearsheimer 
and Walt that the capacity of the Lobby has a cooling effect on criticism against the pro-
Israel policy, primarily because the Christian Zionist movement's ideology rejects the 
premise. Movement elites emphasize that many prominent voices speak against the pro-
Israel policy project, and frame their movement as part of a broader tradition of religion 
to speak unpopular truth to power. 
What is unique about the interest group's lobbying efforts is their status as a 
purely ideological project. The community of believers that subscribe to the project are 
the points of access by which the Christian Zionist lobby is able to accomplish the 
political goals of the project and influence the policy formation process. The power of 
the Christian Zionist lobby rests in its ability to frame its ideological project as a political 
project, to construct a community of believers, to rearticulate the movement's ideological 
frame to those believers, and to mobilize them from a place of apathetic 
support of Israel, into active agency to accomplish the movement's policy goals. These 
policy goals exist outside of the realist articulation of the national interests. The 
Christian Zionist lobby seeks relative increases in power for the U.S., but only as a means 
to an end. The decline in soft power that proves Mearsheimer and Walt's critique is not a 
concern of Christian Zionists. Opposition to the U.S. is anticipated in their ideology, 
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because the ideology frames support for Israel as a source of conflict with international 
opinion. 
In conclusion, this project leaves significant space for further research. Much 
more detailed analysis is needed to adequately measure Christian Zionist financial 
contributions. Analysis of the movements influence will be greatly advanced once the 
George W. Bush administration leaves office, and scholars have access to internal 
information. At this point, it will be plausible to test whether Christian Zionist lobbying 
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